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NAVIGATING UNCHARTED
WATERS: ALASKA NATIVE
CORPORATIONS IN A NEW ERA OF
8(A) CONTRACTING
EMILY M. MAASS*
ABSTRACT
The highly anticipated finalized rule changes to the Small Business
Administration 8(a) Business Development Program will have a prominent
impact on 8(a) certified Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs). This Article
evaluates the weaknesses in the previous regulations and analyzes how the
revisions will effect ANC participation. The Article argues that the revisions
address a number of ambiguities in the original regulations without limiting
ANC participation in the 8(a) Business Development Program, but other
factors may prove critical to future ANC contract procurement.

INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the Small Business Administration (SBA) finalized rule
changes to how it implements section 8(a) of the Small Business Act.1
These changes (2011 Revisions) took effect on March 14, 2011.2 The 2011
Revisions respond to concerns about lack of clarity in the original
regulations and criticisms of Alaska Native Corporation (ANC)
participation in the business development program.3 The 2011
Revisions’ stated goals include clarifying program guidelines to avoid
confusion and addressing concerns of program benefit abuse.4 The
* B.A., Hollins University, 2006; J.D., University at Buffalo Law School, 2009. The
author is an attorney in Anchorage, Alaska, a law clerk to the Honorable John
Suddock of the Alaska Superior Court, and a former law clerk to the judges of
the Anchorage District Court. Many thanks to all family, friends, and colleagues
for their encouragement throughout the writing and editing process.
1. Small Business Size Regulations; 8(a) Business Development/Small
Disadvantaged Business Status Determinations, 76 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8222 (Feb. 11,
2011) [hereinafter 8(a) Business Development].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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following sections explore this topic with a focus on the changes as they
relate to ANC participation in the SBA. Part I provides a brief history of
ANCs and describes their integration into the 8(a) Business
Development Program. Part II summarizes the criticisms of ANC
participation in the program and outlines the ultimate objectives of the
2011 Revisions. Finally, Part III examines how the finalized 2011
Revisions and their rule changes will impact ANC participation in the
8(a) Business Development Program.

I. ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS AND SECTION 8(A)
A.

A New Approach to Aboriginal Land Claims

ANCs were created through the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act of 1971 (ANCSA) as an experiment. Rather than resort to the failing
reservation system of the lower forty-eight states, ANCSA legislation
established a corporate framework to govern the relationship between
Alaska Natives and the United States government.5 ANCSA
extinguished aboriginal land claims in Alaska to allow the State of
Alaska and the federal government to obtain rights to the abundant oil
and minerals found in the state. In exchange, Alaska Natives received
$962 million6 and title to approximately forty-four million acres of land.7
Most importantly, ANCSA gave Alaska Natives a business
structure with which to administer these new land rights and create
future profits for shareholders.8 ANCSA created twelve regional
corporations within Alaska, each characterized by ancestral history and
geography, and a thirteenth Regional Corporation for Alaska Natives
living outside the state.9 ANCSA also established additional village
corporations within the regional corporations’ geographic areas.10

5. H.R. REP. NO. 92-746, at 8 (1971) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2247, 2253; see also Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L.
No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h
(2012)).
6. See 43 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), (3) (2012).
7. See id. § 1613 (conveying land); see also James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act at 35: Delivering on the Promise, 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 1, 12–24 (2007).
8. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012).
9. Id. § 1606.
10. Id. § 1607.
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Upon incorporation, the ANCs identified and distributed shares to
a total of 79,044 Alaska Natives.11 ANC shares are inalienable; they
cannot be issued or sold save for very limited circumstances among
family members.12 Additionally, ANCSA exempts ANCs from the
regulations of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.13 These
provisions ensure that ANC ownership remains with the population the
ANC was created to serve, but they also limit the ANCs in their ability
to raise capital quickly and compete in the general market.

Geographical Designations of Alaska Native Regional Corporations.14
B.

Strengthening Communities to Honor Native Values

Forty years after ANCSA, ANCs are major participants in Alaska’s
economy. In 2008, when a widespread economic recession caused losses
for businesses across the United States, ANCs experienced 17.5% overall

11. NATIVE 8(A) WORKS, FACT SHEET: CALCULATING BENEFITS TO
SHAREHOLDERS 1, available at http://www.Native8aworks.com/the_facts/docs/
EIG038%20Benefits%20Sholder%20Handout.pdf.
12. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(1)(B)–(C).
13. Id. § 1625(a).
14. FRANK NORRIS, U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERV., ALASKA
SUBSISTENCE: A NATIONAL PARK SERVICE MANAGEMENT HISTORY Map 4-1 (2002),
available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/norris1.
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growth in revenues.15 By 2011, twenty-two of the top forty-nine
businesses in Alaska were ANCs.16 Through steady development and
profits, ANCs have become economic powerhouses within Alaska.
Combined, ANCs provide 64% of Alaskan jobs and generate 74% of the
state’s revenue.17
Business success gives ANCs the ability to serve as centers of their
communities. Alaska Natives have close ties to the land and often live in
extreme environments, in villages not connected to the road system, and
far from creature comforts. Rural life can be difficult, limiting, and
expensive, but many Alaska Natives consider it central to their
heritage.18 Today a total of 112,686 regional and village corporation
shareholders benefit from ANC profits.19 In 2008, ANCs distributed a
total of $171 million, or 66% of total net profits, to shareholders in the
form of dividends.20
In addition to paying annual dividends, ANCs provide unique
benefits to shareholders such as subsidies for food, heat, insurance, and
education.21 Shareholders are also eligible for preferential hiring within
the corporations, scholarships, subsistence training, and youth camps.22
In 2010, ANCs reported employing a total of 3,577 Alaska Natives,
approximately 10% of the corporations’ total workforces. Moreover, they
contributed $11 million to scholarships in 2008.23 These are just a few
illustrations of ANCs’ positive impact on Alaska’s economy and Alaska
Native communities.

15. ANCSA REG’L ASS’N, TRANSFORMATIONS: ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS
2010 ECONOMIC DATA 8 (2010), available at http://www.ciri.com/content/
history/documents/ANCSA_EconomicReport_2010.pdf.
16. Id. at 9.
17. Debbie Cutler, 2011 Alaska’s Top 49ers: Superheroes of Success, ALASKA
BUS.
MONTHLY,
Oct.
2011,
at
60,
available
at
http://issuu.com/alaska_business_monthly/docs/october-2010.
18. See generally Robert O’Harrow Jr., In Alaska, a Promise Unmet, WASH.
POST, Sept. 30, 2010, at A1.
19. NATIVE 8(A) WORKS, supra note 11, at 1.
20. ANCSA REG’L ASS’N, supra note 15, at 8.
21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-399, INCREASED USE OF
ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS’ SPECIAL 8(A) PROVISIONS CALLS FOR TAILORED
OVERSIGHT 81–83 (2006).
22. Id. at 83–84; see also Linxwiler, supra note 7, at 12–46.
23. NATIVE 8(A) WORKS, supra note 11, at 2.
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A Hand Up, Not a Hand Out

Alaska Native communities did not immediately realize the
economic benefits of ANCs. In fact, the transition from subsistence and
rural lifestyles to running Western corporate entities nearly destroyed
several regional corporations within their first twenty years of
incorporation.24 Since the mid-1980s, a substantial number of
corporations have enjoyed success due in part to their participation in
the SBA 8(a) Business Development Program (8(a) BD Program).25
The 8(a) BD Program is designed to assist socially and
economically disadvantaged small business owners in becoming
competitively viable.26 The program allows qualifying firms to procure
government contracts on a sole-source, or non-competitive, basis.27 Once
admitted, firms may participate for up to nine years before graduating
from the program.28
The SBA arranges with each agency for 8(a) certified businesses to
complete the set-aside contracts.29 The SBA uses a variety of methods to
award contracts to a particular firm. The most common method is an
inter-program competition, but the contracting federal agency or the
SBA may also make a special selection for a particular contract.30 No
matter how the SBA chooses a firm, the federal agency is prohibited
from paying more than the fair market price for the work to be
performed.31 The 8(a) BD Program provides a way for small businesses
that lack the resources to procure bid-awarded government contracts to
gain valuable business opportunities. For ANCs, 8(a) participation offers
a special opportunity to increase revenues and, consequently, provide
benefits to Alaska Native shareholders.32

24. See Travis G. Buchanan, One Company, Two Worlds: The Case for Alaska
Native Corporations, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 297, 303–04 & n.42 (2010); see also INST. OF
SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, BENEFITS OF ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS AND THE SBA
8(A) BD PROGRAM TO ALASKA NATIVES AND ALASKA 8 (2009), available at
iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/8(a)/Full_Report.pdf; Linxwiler, supra note 7,
at 12–45.
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 6.
26. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8223 (Feb. 11, 2011).
27. 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e) (2012); see also 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2012) (“Sole source
acquisition means a contract for the purchase of supplies or services that is
entered into or proposed to be entered into by an agency after soliciting and
negotiating with only one source.” (emphasis added)).
28. 13 C.F.R. § 124.2 (2012).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
30. Buchanan, supra note 24, at 303–04 & n.42.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A).
32. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 80–84.
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The core of the 8(a) BD Program is small business development.
When program regulations were amended in 1986, ANCs were young
corporations with widely varying levels of success. Individual ANCs
and their subsidiaries were not necessarily prepared to single-handedly
take on complex government contracts. Partnership agreements offered
a solution.
SBA guidelines permit 8(a) firms to partner with non-8(a) firms in
mentor-protégé relationships to seek guidance and support. When
necessary or desirable, an 8(a) firm can even enter into a joint venture
agreement with one or more non-8(a) firms to work together for a
limited duration on a specific contract.33 By forming partnerships within
the 8(a) BD Program, ANC subsidiaries can offer a broad range of
services and complete complex government contracts.34 This facilitates
business growth and skill development for future expansion without
reliance on government intervention.35
D.

Special Rights for Native-Owned Businesses

Congress used ANCSA as the foundation to amend the 8(a) BD
Program to specifically include ANCs.36 The amendments accounted for
the unique government-to-government relationship between the federal
government and Alaska Natives by exempting ANCs from certain
program limitations.37 Typically, individual owners of the
approximately 9,000 participating small businesses must qualify for 8(a)
certification by proving their socially or economically disadvantaged
status.38 But ANCSA automatically grants ANCs this status.39 Also, SBA
guidelines typically limit 8(a) BD Program participants to one 8(a)

33. Id. at 30.
34. Id. at 6–7.
35. Press Release, NANA Dev. Corp., SBA Issues Final Rules on 8(a) Ushers
in New Generation for Successful Program (Mar. 11, 2011), available at
http://nana-dev.com/news_and_press/news_archive/
sba_issues_final_rules_on_8_a__ushers_in_new_gen.
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4)(A)(i)(II); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2012)
(creating a rebuttable presumption that Alaska Natives are socially
disadvantaged).
37. ACQUISITION AND GRANTS OFFICE, NAT’L OCEANIC ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
UNIQUE RIGHTS OF ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATION OWNED 8(A) BUSINESSES IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT PROCESS 3 (1996), available at
http://www.ago.noaa.gov/ago/acquisition/docs/alaska_native_contracting.p
df.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 637 (a)(1)(B), (a)(4).
39. 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(2) (2012).
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certified firm in a lifetime.40 ANCs have no such limit, essentially
allowing parent ANCs to establish multiple subsidiaries for 8(a)
certification, provided that each subsidiary operates within a different
primary industry.41 Additionally, most 8(a) firms are limited by
“competitive thresholds” of $4 million for service contracts and $6.5
million for manufacturing contracts. These thresholds do not apply to
tribally-owned firms, allowing ANCs to receive sole-source government
contracts regardless of the dollar amount.42
E.

A Foundation for Success

In 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that
twelve of the thirteen regional corporations, thirty-three village
corporations, and four urban corporations had subsidiaries participating
in the 8(a) BD Program.43 This meant big business for participating
ANCs, Alaska Natives, and the Alaskan economy. From 2000 to 2004,
ANCs procured a total of $2.9 billion in government contract
obligations.44 During those years, 77% of 8(a) contracts procured by
ANCs were awarded on a sole-source basis.45
Today, government contracts, both within and outside of the 8(a)
BD Program, account for the majority of ANC revenues.46 In 2010,
Sealaska Corporation (Sealaska) attributed just over half of its revenues
to government services.47 Meanwhile, Bering Straits Regional
Corporation attributed 94% of its 2010 revenues to government
services.48 Also in 2010, Ahtna Regional Corporation earned 70% of its
$243 million in revenues from government services while Aleut
Management Services attributed 80% of its revenues to government
services.49 Both of these regional corporations report that the 8(a) BD

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 3.
Id.
13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (2012); 48 C.F.R. § 19.805-1(a)–(b).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 78–79.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Julie Stricker, 2010 ANCSA Regional Corporation Overview, ALASKA BUS.
MONTHLY, Sept. 1, 2011, at 72, available at http://issuu.com/
alaska_business_monthly/docs/september_2011?mode=window&viewMode=d
oublePage.
47. Id. at 81.
48. Id. at 74.
49. Id. at 73.
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Program has been key to growth and success but that the time has come
to diversify and endeavor toward competitive contracts.50
Only a handful of ANCs are not heavily reliant on government
contracts for significant portions of their annual revenues. In most cases,
ANCs that flourish without government contracts have diverse business
holdings and rights to lands that are rich in natural resources. Bristol
Bay Native Corporation and Cook Inlet Regional, Inc. (CIRI) both
maintain substantial business interests outside of the 8(a) BD Program
and have landholdings rich in natural resources.51 North Slope-based
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC) holds title to five million
acres of highly mineralized land and paid staggering dividends of
$51.83 per share in 2010.52 Calista Regional Corporation subsidiaries
Yulista and Tunista Arctic Rim are both 8(a) BD Program graduates that
recently began acquiring non-ANC Alaska businesses.53
Similarly, Doyon, Ltd. has varied its business interests among four
“pillars.”54 Doyon typically attributed the bulk of its profits to oilfield
services, but the government contracting pillar took the lead in 2010,
accounting for roughly two-thirds of Doyon’s revenues.55 Additionally,
Doyon, the largest private landowner in Alaska, reports that it is
exploring its landholdings for gold, zinc, lead, and copper. This
diversified and steady growth indicates that Doyon does not require 8(a)
government contracts to survive.56
The contrast between ANCs that attribute substantial portions of
revenues to government services and those that thrive without these
valuable contracts indicates that some ANCs need the 8(a) BD Program
more than others. The key variable in this difference is usually whether
a given ANC has rights to lands with abundant and accessible natural
resources. Clearly the 8(a) BD Program provides the benefits it promises
to those ANCs that choose to participate. But for those more dependent
on government contracts for income, certain revisions could lead to
financial instability in the coming years.

50. Id. at 73–74.
51. Id. at 75, 78.
52. Id. at 72–73.
53. Id. at 76–77.
54. Id. at 78.
55. Id.
56. Id. (identifying Doyon’s four “pillars” as oilfield services, government
contracting, natural resource development, and transitional).
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II. CALLS FOR CHANGE FROM “OUTSIDE”
The majority of scrutiny over ANC participation in the 8(a) BD
Program came from sources outside Alaska. These critics cited a broad
spectrum of issues pertaining to continued procurement of sole-source
contracts by ANCs. Primary concerns included whether program
benefits reach shareholders,57 ANCs obtaining a large percentage of 8(a)
contracts,58 regional corporations exceeding small business size
limitations, and ANC practices of hiring non-Native managers and
subcontracting work to non-8(a) firms.59 The sum of these concerns was
the view that ANCs are not minority-operated businesses, thereby
depriving shareholders of the expected benefits from increased access to
government contracts.60
Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) and House Representative
Bennie Thompson (D-Mississippi), both harsh critics of ANCs, fueled
this criticism.61 Rather than call for revision or compromise, Senator
McCaskill and Representative Thompson each introduced bills in early
2011 to remove all preferential status for ANCs under the 8(a) BD
Program.62 Moreover, they proposed eliminating the automatic
designation of economically and socially disadvantaged status for
ANCs, an action that would effectively be a legislative violation of
ANCSA.63 But their criticisms were based on incomplete reports, a lack
57. Robert O’Harrow, Behind Lucrative Deals, A Disconnect, WASH. POST, Oct.
1, 2010, at A1.
58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 12.
59. Id.; U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS SUBCOMM.
ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT, NEW INFORMATION ABOUT CONTRACTING
PREFERENCES FOR ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS (PART II) 12, 16 (2009)
[hereinafter U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.], available at
http://mccaskill.senate.gov/pdf/071509/ANC.pdf.
60. Elise Castelli, Alaska Contracts Alarm Critics, FED. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2009,
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20090720/ACQUISITION03/907200301/
1024/DEPARTMENTS05; O’Harrow, supra note 18.
61. Hearing on Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Contracting Oversight of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security,
111 Cong. 1–2 (2009) (statement of Sen. McCaskill, Member, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security).
62. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Homeland Sec.
Press Ctr., Thompson Calls for Elimination of the Alaskan Native Corporation
Carve-Out (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/press/
index.asp?ID=613.
63. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. 8233–8234, (Feb. 11, 2011); see
also S. 3959, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 598, 111th Cong. (2010). The proposition to
extinguish ANCs’ automatic designation as socially and economically
disadvantaged violates the ANCSA provision that reads: “For all purposes of
Federal law, a Native Corporation shall be considered to be a corporation owned
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of compiled data, and overarching calls for increased oversight in
government contracting programs.64 With only a partial view of the
situation, critics failed to account for essential variables in their analyses
of ANC participation in the 8(a) BD Program.
The purpose and function of 8(a) participation is far more complex
for ANCs than for their non-Native counterparts. In addition to building
viable businesses, ANCs are charged with providing economic, social,
and cultural benefits to their shareholders.65 ANCs are diverse in terms
of size, culture, and the communities they represent, and they use their
profits differently to meet their respective needs.66 As such, a simple
comparison between ANC and non-ANC 8(a) activities does not tell the
whole story.
Alaska Senators Lisa Murkowski and Mark Begich defended ANCs
against these charges, but they recognized that reforms may be in
order.67 Moreover, in response to the proposed bills, leaders from ASRC,
Doyon, and CIRI—three of the largest ANCs, together representing over
35,000 shareholders—issued a joint statement calling for radical changes
to 8(a) BD Program regulations.68 Some of the changes for which these
and controlled by Natives and a minority and economically disadvantaged
business enterprise. . . .” 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(1) (2012).
64. In 2010 the Alaska Law Review published a note that examined and
identified the weaknesses in these criticisms and argued for a holistic view of
ANC participation in the 8(a) BD Program. See Buchanan, supra note 24, at 315
n.98.
65. See generally ANCSA REG’L ASS’N, supra note 15.
66. Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, Legislative Dir., Native Am.
Contractors Assoc. (Nov. 10, 2011).
67. Sean Cockerham, Alaska Delegation Wary of Native Contracting
Investigation: Hearing Could Be “Showboat” Politics, Begich Says, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 6, 2011, http://www.adn.com/2011/10/05/2106314/alaskadelegation-wary-of-probe.html (“Instead of a showboat political hearing, what’s
needed is proper oversight from the federal government to prevent activities like
[the EyakTek GTSI incident] in the future and Sen. Begich is working toward
that goal.”); Rhoda McBride, Senate Candidates Address Alaska Native Issues at
Forum, KTUU (Oct. 7, 2010), http://articles.ktuu.com/2010-10-07/alaskaNatives_24130067 (“‘We must stand behind these programs that allow for
opportunity for our Alaska Natives,’ Murkowski said. Murkowski did say that
her support was not unconditional, and that Native corporations need to be held
accountable when managing government contracts.”).
68. These ANCs cite building sustainable businesses and reducing repeated
violations for proposing these revisions: “Our proposed reforms are intended to
build on the successes of the 8(a) program by promoting more competition,
strengthening enforcement against those who repeatedly violate the rules of the
program and requiring Native 8(a) companies to track and report benefits
derived from their 8(a) contracts.” Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp.,
Strengthening the 8(a) BD program (Sept. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.asrc.com/CorpNews/Pages/News-3.aspx.
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ANCs advocated included tracking and reporting shareholder benefits,
requiring specific justification for sole-source awards exceeding $100
million, and increasing enforcement of existing SBA regulations.69
With ANC participants cooperating, the SBA began to review its
8(a) guidelines. For twenty-five years, the SBA and 8(a) participants had
observed how ANCs function within the program. Through continued
program participation, interested parties—ANC supporters and critics—
identified certain provisions in the original guidelines that create
challenges for 8(a) certified firms. Though this debate subjected ANCs to
harsh, and often unfair, criticism, the dialogue proved to be timely in
promoting a review of 8(a) guidelines.70

III. ANSWERS TO CALLS FOR REFORM
Prior to publishing its final revisions, the SBA reviewed comments
submitted by interested parties and conducted a series of tribal
consultations, including some with ANC leaders.71 The updated
program regulations are comprehensive and applicable to all 8(a)
certified firms.72 But some revisions are more significant to Nativeowned firms, particularly ANCs, than others. The most pertinent
revisions for ANC participation include new regulations for SBA
oversight, clearer subsidiary and industry code guidelines, stricter rules
for the mentor-protégé program, and clarified requirements for 8(a) joint
ventures.73
A.

Transparency to the SBA, Deference to ANCs

Those suspicious of ANC participation in the 8(a) BD Program
suggested that Alaska Native communities do not receive sufficient
program benefits from sole-source government contracts procured by
their respective ANCs. Pre-revision ANCSA required that ANCs
provide shareholders with annual reports of corporate activities,74 but
insufficient compiled data makes this accusation difficult to summarily
69. Id.
70. Government agencies periodically review program regulations. This
was the first series of comprehensive revisions in over ten years. 8(a) Business
Development, 76 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8222 (Feb. 11, 2011).
71. Id.
72. Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66.
73. Revised 8(a) Business Development Program Regulations Fact Sheet, U.S.
SMALL BUS.
ADMIN.,
http://www.sba.gov/content/revised-8a-businessdevelopment-program-regulations-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
74. 43 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2012).

MAASS.V22 (DO NOT DELETE)

62

4/16/2012 4:55 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 29:1

disprove.75 After the 2011 Revisions, the SBA now requires ANCs,
Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations participating in the
8(a) BD Program to communicate certain activities directly to the SBA.
The purpose of this new regulation is to ensure that the corporation is
not making business choices that are detrimental to the community.76
Additional revisions provide the SBA with recourse when participants
act in violation of these regulations.
1. Reporting Community Benefits
The distinct lack of government data about ANC 8(a) participation
causes outsiders to assume the worst of ANCs: that the communities
they are tasked with serving gain little from 8(a) BD Program
participation. The deficiency in data is directly linked to insufficient SBA
resources, which consequently results in minimal oversight. In 2008, the
Anchorage SBA office, which is charged with monitoring 8(a) contracts
in Alaska and ANC subsidiary activities, had only three staff members
to oversee more than 200 ANC firms.77 Looking forward, the San
Francisco and Philadelphia regional offices will play a much larger role
in fulfilling the tasks previously assigned to the Anchorage office in an
attempt to increase the flow of information to the agency.78
In a more precise attempt to acquire data, a new regulation
stipulates that ANCs, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations
must annually report the financial benefits of the 8(a) BD Program
flowing back to their communities. ANC regional corporations will
submit one report on behalf of all their subsidiaries.79 ANCs’ responses
to this revision have been positive. In fact, the new reporting
requirement is similar to a revision suggested by ASRC, CIRI and
Doyon.80 The requirement will give ANCs the chance to display their
success and disprove the recent allegations of abuse, fraud, and waste
by highlighting the wide array of benefits provided to shareholders.81
Though annual reporting is nothing new to ANCs, compliance will
require more than simply passing this information along to the SBA.
Native communities across the United States expressed concern that the
federal government will impose its generic view of acceptable

75. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 39.
76. Press Release, NANA Dev. Corp., supra note 35.
77. Castelli, supra note 60.
78. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. 8222, 8238 (Feb. 11, 2011).
79. Id. at 8248 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.604 (2012)).
80. Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., supra note 68.
81. Press Release, NANA Dev. Corp., supra note 35; Telephone Interview
with Dennis Worden, supra note 66.
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community benefits without having the ability to distinguish between
the needs of each community.82 Alaska Native communities vary widely
in cultural and community needs, just as their respective Native
corporations vary in size and complexity. Consequently, the best
methods to meet the unique needs of each community vary widely. One
ANC might best serve its shareholders entirely through direct dividend
payments while another might choose to use some profits to provide a
variety of community services. Though the SBA takes a broader
approach to recognizing benefits to Native communities, it remains to be
seen how indirect benefits, such as reinvesting profits in the corporation,
will be viewed by the federal government overall.83
The difficulties with this proposed reporting scheme and the 2011
Revisions’ incomplete language creating these defects is reminiscent of
the same problems the new regulation attempts to remedy. In response,
the SBA delayed implementation of the reporting requirement for six
months to find a practical solution with input from Native 8(a)
participants.84 In June 2011, the Native American Contractors
Association presented the SBA with a model reporting form designed to
account for the diverse Native firms and their communities. The SBA
has not published its final decision on the reporting method, but it
continues to communicate with Native-owned participants in the
interim.85
2. Clarifying Excessive Withdrawals
In business vernacular, “withdrawals” typically include officer
salaries, bonuses, advances, loans, individual investments, and
speculative ventures.86 Although the 8(a) BD Program always prohibited
excessive withdrawals, the SBA previously had little to no means of
enforcing this limitation.87 The 2011 Revisions provide recourse for
excessive withdrawal violations. The SBA may terminate or “early
graduate” firms from the 8(a) BD Program for making withdrawals that
are detrimental to the achievement of program targets, objectives, and
goals.88 To modernize the regulation to contemporary financial
standards, the SBA also increased the thresholds of what withdrawals

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66.
Id.
8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8236.
Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66.
13 C.F.R. § 124.112(d) (2012).
8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8326.
Id. at 8239 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.303(a)(13)).
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would be considered “excessive” by $100,000.89 For ANCs, which
typically have annual sales in excess of $2 million, a withdrawal for the
benefit of an individual within the firm may be deemed “excessive” if it
exceeds $400,000.90
ANCSA requires that ANC boards of directors consist of
shareholders, meaning Alaska Natives, but no such requirements exist
for filling officer positions.91 Based on the previous definition of
“withdrawals,” it would seem that ANCs are now limited to paying
executives and consultants $400,000 per year for their contributions to
government contracts procured through the 8(a) BD Program.
But, the 2011 Revisions also changed the definition of the term
“withdrawal” to no longer include officer salaries.92 According to the
SBA, this allows 8(a) firms to recruit and retain key employees by
offering competitive salaries.93 For ANCs this means that officer salaries
are not limited by the new excessive withdrawal thresholds, regardless
of whether a shareholder holds the position.94 The SBA yields to ANC
judgment even further by excluding tribally owned firms from the
excessive withdrawal prohibition.95 Instead, only excessive withdrawals
made for the personal benefit of a non-Native manager are open to SBA
scrutiny.96 The SBA asserts its interest in ensuring that financial benefits
reach Alaska Native shareholders, but it defers to ANC leadership to
determine the best investments in future officers and business
ventures.97
B.

Reaching and Re-identifying Industry Goals

Under the original 8(a) BD Program guidelines, if an 8(a) firm met
its “targets, objectives, and goals,” the SBA had the discretion to force
the firm into “early graduation” prior to the expiration of its nine-year
tenure.98 But, because goals can change due to unanticipated market
shifts, a better measurement of success may be growth. In either case,

89. Id. at 8237 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.303(a)(13)).
90. Id.
91. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(f) (2012); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 21, at 3.
92. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8236.
93. Id.
94. Some critics objected to 8(a) certified ANCs hiring non-Natives for high
salary executive and consultant positions. See supra note 59.
95. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8236.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 8236–37.
98. 13 C.F.R. § 124.302 (2012).
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the 8(a) firm would have achieved its program goals so that continued
participation would no longer be necessary.
The 8(a) BD Program identifies small businesses depending on the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code within
which the small business operates.99 When a business applies for 8(a)
certification, it must qualify as “small” according to its primary NAICS
code.100 ANCs must meet the same size standards as all other participant
firms to qualify for 8(a) certification, but subsidiaries are assessed apart
from the ANC parent corporation.101 If an 8(a) certified firm outgrows
the limits for its NAICS code, it is technically ineligible for the 8(a) BD
Program. Under the original guidelines, however, this restriction was
not enforceable in practice. Instead, the SBA reserved the “early
graduation” option for firms that met their “targets, objectives and
goals.”102 Moreover, growing beyond “small business” status was not
recognized as a universal objective under the previous 8(a) guidelines.
The 2011 Revisions require 8(a) certified firms to remain “small”
according to their primary NAICS codes throughout their nine years in
the 8(a) BD Program.103 If a firm exceeds its size limit for three
successive years, the SBA has the discretion to “early graduate” the firm
just as if it had reached its program “targets, objectives and goals.”104
Previously, the 8(a) regulations barred participant firms from
changing to a different primary NAICS code, even if the majority of
their revenues came from work performed under secondary industry
codes.105 The 2011 Revisions now allow a firm to switch primary NAICS
codes if the majority of its revenues have evolved from the former code
to a new code over a two-year period.106 This option is also available

99. See North American Industry Classification System, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics (last revised Jan. 11, 2012) (“The
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the standard used by
Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the
purposes of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the
U.S. business economy.”).
100. 13 C.F.R. § 124.102(a)(2).
101. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 26–27.
102. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8227.
103. Id. at 8228 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.102(a)(2)).
104. Id. at 8228–29 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.302(c)).
105. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.3 (2010) (“Primary industry classification means the
four digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code designation which best
describes the primary business activity of the 8(a) BD applicant or Participant.
The SIC code designations are described in the Standard Industrial Classification
Manual Published by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.”).
106. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8227 (codified at 13 C.F.R. §
124.3 (2012)).
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retrospectively. An 8(a) participant facing early graduation can remain
in the program if it demonstrates an attempt to change its industry focus
to a secondary NAICS code. The secondary NAICS code must have a
larger size limitation to justify the increase, and any plans to shift
NAICS codes must be contained in the firm’s most recently approved
business plan.107 Allowing firms to switch primary NAICS codes in the
midst of program participation will likely prove vital to thorough
program oversight and allow firms to complete their nine years of
program eligibility.
Another significant change involving NAICS industry codes
pertains to the timing for ANCs to create new subsidiaries for 8(a)
contract procurement. In general terms, ANCs can create unlimited
subsidiaries to participate in the 8(a) BD Program. For ANC parent
companies, the original regulations only required that the company not
have more than one subsidiary operating within a given NAICS code on
a primary basis. For subsidiaries, the original regulations only required
that the subsidiary conduct business within its primary NAICS code for
two years before applying for 8(a) certification.108 No regulations
prohibited ANC parent companies from replacing subsidiaries facing
program graduation through other means. In an effort to continue
procuring contracts within a desirable industry, ANC parent companies
had the option to certify new subsidiaries under the same NAICS code
on a secondary basis.109 The new subsidiary would overlap with its
predecessor in every way, sometimes even rehiring the same employees
and continuing to procure contracts from the same government
agencies.110
If an ANC formed a partnership with a non-8(a) corporation, that
partnership was free to establish multiple subsidiaries and partnerships
through which to participate in the 8(a) BD Program. For example, if
such an ANC and its partner were to establish a joint venture called JV I,
two years later it could then establish another joint venture, JV II,
operating under the same NAICS code on a secondary basis. The
partnership would procure sole-source government contracts through
JV I for nine years. Upon the graduation of JV I, the partnership would
then use JV II to continue to procure contracts within that coveted
NAICS code.

107.
108.
109.
110.

13 C.F.R. § 124.112(e).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 3.
13 C.F.R. 124.109(c)(3)(ii) (2010).
See 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8234.
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In 2006, the GAO identified an ANC with seven subsidiaries, six of
which marketed capabilities within the NAICS code for “facilities
support services” at various levels of priority.111 Instances such as this
raised concerns regarding the possibility and likelihood that ANCs
would rotate subsidiaries within various NAICS codes indefinitely.112
Now, under the 2011 Revisions, when a subsidiary graduates from the
program, two years must pass before the parent corporation can
establish a new subsidiary in the same NAICS code and take on 8(a) BD
Program government contracts.113 Further, ANCs and other triballyowned subsidiaries cannot procure follow-on contracts to 8(a) contracts
previously performed by a subsidiary of the same parent corporation.114
This particular regulatory revision will have a clear impact on
ANCs, all of which have a history of creating subsidiaries for 8(a) BD
Program participation.115 Consequently, ANCs will have to adjust their
business plans to obtain certain types of government contracts and
consider expanding future subsidiaries into new industries.
This regulation levels the playing field for all 8(a) firms with
interests in the same industry and encourages ANC subsidiaries to enter
new areas of business. As noted above, Calista subsidiaries Yulista and
Tunista Arctic Rim both graduated from the 8(a) BD Program after nineyear tenures. As of 2011, both subsidiaries remain in business, forming
partnerships and taking on competitive contracts without 8(a) BD
Program benefits.116 Sealaska subsidiary SES Solutions offers another
success story. After graduating from the 8(a) BD Program, SES Solutions
now competes for contracts and independently forms joint ventures.117
Clearly program graduation does not spell the demise of these
subsidiaries, but rather promotes the true spirit of the 8(a) BD program:
helping socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses to

111. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 85.
112. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8234.
113. Id. at 8227.
114. Id. at 8234 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(3)(ii) (2012)).
115. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 34.
116. Stricker, supra note 46, at 77.
117. See, e.g., Sealaska Subsidiary Wins D.O.E. Contract, SEALASKA,
http://www.sealaska.com/object/io_1218675306322.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2012) (“SES is the managing partner in a small business joint venture with Tetra
Tech EC, Inc., a New Jersey based international environmental remediation
company, called SES-TECH Global Solutions. The JV team will share in the $700
million contract ceiling over the next seven years with two other contract
winners.”).

MAASS.V22 (DO NOT DELETE)

68

4/16/2012 4:55 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 29:1

develop in order to fully participate in the economy without
government support.118
C.

Mentor-Protégé Relationships

The SBA established the mentor-protégé program to encourage
non-8(a) firms to provide technical, financial, and other assistance to 8(a)
BD Program participants in the course of contract performance. These
partnerships give 8(a) firms access to capital, create new subsidiaries,
form joint ventures, or otherwise allow 8(a) firms to obtain a better
position when seeking contracts.119 In exchange, the mentor firm may
perform work on 8(a) government contracts via an “exclusion from
affiliation” of the small business size limitations.120 In 2006,
approximately twenty-four ANC subsidiaries participated in the
mentor-protégé program.121 Prior to the 2011 Revisions, federal agencies
were often unclear as to which business relationships qualified as
partnerships.122
The program charges mentor firms with a duty to provide their
protégés with actual, substantive business development assistance.123
But this regulation was not strictly enforced.124 Previously, mentorprotégé agreements needed only to describe the assistance provided by
the mentor.125 The new rules stipulate that the mentor must specifically
address how it will assist its protégé in meeting the goals described in its
business plan.126 In another effort by the SBA to avoid the exploitation of
8(a) BD Program participants, mentor firms that fail to provide protégé
firms with sufficient assistance will face stop-work orders or debarment
from program participation.127 This revision provides protégés and the
SBA peace of mind that mentor firms will fulfill their duties rather than
use protégés as a front for access to sole-source contracts.
To further promote the mentor-protégé option, after the 2011
Revisions the SBA now permits interested businesses to form multiple
mentor-protégé relationships. Mentor firms may have up to three
118. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8234.
119. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 29–30.
120. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8223.
121. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 30.
122. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.520 (2012).
123. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8223.
124. Id. at 8246–47.
125. 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(e)(1) (2010).
126. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8244 (codified at 13 C.F.R. §
124.520(e)(1)(i) (2012)).
127. Id. at 8247 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(h)).
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protégés if the protégé firms are not in direct competition with one
another.128 Additionally, protégés with operations in multiple lines of
business can obtain a second mentor.129 The second mentorship cannot
conflict with the first, and the mentorship must refer to an unrelated,
secondary NAICS code within which the first mentor cannot provide
expertise.130 The SBA also clarified that 8(a) firms scheduled to graduate
within six months are not eligible for protégé status,131 nor are firms
currently serving as mentors.132 Also, once a firm reaches the end of its
mentor-protégé agreement or exits the 8(a) BD Program, it is no longer
eligible to benefit from that relationship.133
The SBA increased its oversight of the mentor-protégé program to
ensure that 8(a) participants receive the appropriate benefits from these
relationships. Mentors of ANC firms can no longer merely buttress the
subsidiary’s fulfillment of contracts. Instead, mentors will have to
account for the actual developmental support provided to their protégés
throughout the partnership.134 In addition, the revision allowing a
second mentor for ANCs operating within multiple NAICS codes serves
a dual purpose. The provision gives ANCs greater growth opportunities
and forces each ANC to splice its business practices officially, thus
allowing for increased oversight. The number of 8(a) firms forming
mentor-protégé partnerships is not likely to decrease in the future as a
result of these revisions. Instead, more partnerships will form, albeit
under closer supervision and complying with more administrative
requirements.
D.

Joint Venture Partnerships

For the purposes of the 8(a) BD Program, a joint venture is the
incorporation of a mentor-protégé relationship. The SBA will only
permit a joint venture agreement if the 8(a) participant lacks the
necessary capacity to perform the contract outside a partnership.135 The
SBA must find that the agreement is fair and equitable and will “be of
substantial benefit to the 8(a) [participant].” If the SBA finds that an 8(a)

128. Id. at 8244 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(b)(2)).
129. Id. at 8245 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(c)(3)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 8246 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(c)(5)).
132. 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(c)(4).
133. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8245 (codified at 13 C.F.R. §
124.520(d)(1)(iii)).
134. 13 C.F.R. § 124.520(h).
135. Id. §124.513(a)(2).
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participant brings very little to the joint venture aside from 8(a) status,
the SBA will not approve that joint venture for contract procurement.136
Participation in 8(a) joint ventures is widespread among ANCs. In
2006, the GAO interviewed twenty-six ANCs participating in the 8(a)
subsidiary program. Among those interviewed, twenty-two owned
subsidiaries with a total of fifty-seven joint venture agreements.137 For
example, Bering Straits subsidiary Bering Straits Solutions joined forces
with a California-based federal systems integration company to form
Iteq/Bering Straits Solutions.138 Also, Sealaska partnered with a global
leader in plastics design to form the joint venture Nypro Kánaak in
order to obtain 8(a) contracts for plastics manufacturing.139 These
business relationships give ANCs the opportunity to attempt greater
business challenges and provide economic opportunities to which they
would not normally have access. Furthermore, joint ventures promote
business competition, develop shareholder skills, and provide good
value for taxpayers within the 8(a) BD Program.140
Depending on its business strategy and goals, the recent revisions
could significantly alter the future of a given joint venture. The revisions
most likely to impact ANC joint venture partners include clarified
contract management and work performance requirements, new
regulations limiting subcontracting to non-8(a) partners, and expanded
contract procurement limits.
1. Managerial Experience
Project management is a key aspect of 8(a) BD Program joint
ventures. The managing firm gains significant practical experience and
maintains control over the outcome of the project. But the old 8(a) BD
Program guidelines were previously silent as to whether an 8(a) partner
should manage its joint venture. The 2011 Revisions now dictate that the
8(a) firm must play a managerial role in the joint venture.141 For an
“unpopulated” joint venture, this means that an employee of the 8(a)
partner, in this case the ANC subsidiary, must serve as project

136. Id.
137. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 30.
138. SBA Profile for ITEQ/Bering Straits Solutions, SMALL BUS. ASS’N
DYNAMIC
SMALL
BUS.
SEARCH,
http://dsbs.sba.gov/dsbs/search/
dsp_profile.cfm?User_Id=P0609519 (last updated Nov. 23, 2011).
139. Government
Contracting,
NYPRO
KANAAK,
http://www.nyprokanaak.com/page/governmentcontracting (last visited Feb.
18, 2012).
140. Press Release, NANA Dev. Corp., supra note 35.
141. 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(2).
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manager.142 When a joint venture is “populated,” the joint venture must
demonstrate to the SBA that an 8(a) partner controls performance of the
contract.143
Directing 8(a) BD Program participants to take control of their
business development is one of the more decisive revisions made by the
SBA. Due to the previous lack of regulations pertaining to management
requirements, very little published information exists indicating how
often ANC subsidiaries take the lead in joint venture contracts. Indeed,
in certain circumstances it seems illogical that a joint venture would
choose to name the ANC subsidiary partner as “project manager.” For
example, ESS Support Services regularly partners with Native
corporations of various sizes. One of its largest 8(a) partners is Chiulista
Services, a subsidiary of ANC powerhouse Calista. But ESS Support
Services also regularly partners with small village corporations like
Tikigaq, Kake, Gana-A’Yoo, and Kijic.144 As ESS is a division of the
global corporation Compass Group,145 it is unlikely that the various
small ANC partner firms would take the lead on each joint venture with
ESS Solutions unless prompted by government regulations.
Moreover, some partnerships fail to fit into a particular mold. The
joint venture Bering Straits Orion Management lists two managing
partners, one from Bering Straits and one from the much larger firm
Orion Management. In this case, the non-ANC partner firm is veteranowned and therefore also qualified to receive sole-source contracts
through SBA programs.146 Until the 2011 Revisions, the SBA has not
required specification of such tasks. But now the joint venture must
demonstrate that the 8(a) partner acts as the project manager or risk
program disqualification. Because this is an entirely new requirement,
this revision will substantially impact how joint ventures are structured
and represent themselves to the public.147

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Our
Business
Partners,
ESS
SUPPORT
SERVICES,
http://www.essalaska.com/partners.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
145. Id.
146. The Veteran Benefit Act § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 657(f) (2012).
147. The Washington Post published an exposé on joint ventures between
mentor firm GTSI and Eyak Corp. and a separate joint venture with one of Eyak
Corp.’s direct competitors. The SBA suspected that GTSI was exploiting its
protégé 8(a) partners’ small business status when staff members identified
themselves to customers as GTSI rather than the joint venture. Letter from Tom
Kennedy, Vice President, GTSI, to Multimax/Array GTSI JV Staff (Jul. 22, 2008),
cited in O’Harrow, supra note 57.
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2. Documenting Joint Venture Contract Performance
Work performance minimums for 8(a) joint venture partners are
not new to the 8(a) BD Program.148 But, the prior regulations were
minimally enforced and were often only slightly understood by
program participants. Previously, the regulations mandated that the 8(a)
joint venture partner perform a “significant portion” of the work
required to complete an awarded contract.149 However, the term
“significant portion” was not defined. Additionally, no provisions
outlined different functional reporting requirements depending on
whether a joint venture was “populated” with its own employees, or
“unpopulated,” using the partners’ respective employees to perform
various parts of the contract.
Following major changes, the 2011 Revisions require the 8(a)
participant in “unpopulated” joint ventures to perform at least 40% of
all work done by the joint venture partners, excluding merely
administrative tasks. The non-8(a) partner and its affiliates cannot serve
as subcontractors to the project. Instead, any work performed by the
non-8(a) partner or its affiliates must not account for more than 60% of
all work performed by the joint venture partners. Meanwhile, the 8(a)
partner can perform work directly or as a subcontractor to the project.150
According to the SBA, each partnership must determine whether to
form an “unpopulated” or “populated” joint venture.151 But
“populated” joint ventures are subject to stricter regulations under the
finalized 2011 Revisions. The 8(a) partner seeking approval for a
“populated” joint venture must now demonstrate how it will benefit or
develop its business through the relationship.152 Also, because
employees of “populated” joint ventures work directly for the joint
venture, it is impossible to determine which firm is performing the bulk
of the work. For this reason, specific work requirements for 8(a) partners
to “populated” joint ventures are ineffectual. Instead, the partnership
must demonstrate that the 8(a) partner (1) controls the joint venture, (2)
is responsible for its records, (3) owns at least 50% of the joint venture,
and (4) receives profits commensurate with its ownership.153

148. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.510 (2010) (“To assist the business development of
Participants in the 8(a) BD program, an 8(a) contractor must perform certain
percentages of work with its own employees.”).
149. 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d) (2010).
150. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8224–25 (codified at 13 C.F.R.
§ 124.513(d) (2012)).
151. Id. at 8224.
152. Id. at 8243 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d)(1)).
153. Id. at 8224 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d)).
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3. Subcontracting Work and Maintaining Profit Margins
The ANC practice of subcontracting large portions of work to non8(a) firms bore extensive criticism from governmental and nongovernment critics. A 2009 Senate Subcommittee report suggested that
no-limit, sole source contracts are sometimes awarded to ANCs for the
sole purpose of passing the work through to a non-8(a) firm.154 But
subcontracting is par for the course in completing large government
contracts.155 The real problem was much more specific. Under the old
rules, work performance requirements were satisfied through the joint
venture.156 This allowed non-8(a) joint venture partners to also serve as
subcontractors, sometimes performing a large majority of work on the
contract. The more work the joint venture subcontracted, the smaller the
profits realized by the joint venture. A possible result is the non-8(a)
partner receiving large sums in subcontractors’ fees, thereby benefitting
more from the joint venture than the ANC partner.157
The 2011 Revisions stipulate that non-8(a) joint venture partners
and their affiliates can no longer subcontract to 8(a) joint ventures.158
Instead, any work performed by the non-8(a) partner or its affiliate must
be completed as a portion of the partner’s 60% maximum contribution to
contract performance. This ensures that the joint venture partners
maintain the 40% to 60% work performance ratio required by SBA
guidelines.159 To protect the 8(a) partner’s profit shares, the new
regulations also stipulate that the 8(a) partner must receive profits
commensurate with its work performance or, if incorporated,
commensurate with its ownership interest (51% or more).160 Prior
regulations only required that the 8(a) receive 51% of profits.161 As
discussed above, without clear work performance and ownership
requirements, unnecessarily high performance costs can easily whittle
away profits for the 8(a) partner.
Regardless of the structure of a partnership, all 8(a) partners to a
joint venture must submit work performance reports to the SBA. This
reporting requirement is entirely new to 8(a) joint ventures. The report
must be submitted annually and at the conclusion of the contract to

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 59.
Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66.
13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d) (2010).
8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8240.
Id. (codified at 13 C.F.R. 124.513(d)(2)(ii)).
Id. (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d)(2)(ii)(A)).
Id. at 8243 (codified at 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(4)).
13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(3) (2010).
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explain how the work performance requirement was met.162 By creating
functional barriers to passing through work to larger firms and
requiring regular reporting, the SBA guidelines will make business more
difficult and costly. But the SBA is simultaneously promoting the true
spirit of the program: business development for disadvantaged
populations.
Stricter regulations could have a variety of effects on firms seeking
partnerships. One possibility is an increase in partnering among 8(a)
firms to avoid impropriety in meeting the 40% threshold. Many ANCs
have already begun partnering among themselves and other socially
and economically disadvantaged corporations. A classic example is
Bering Kaya Support Services Joint Venture, a partnership between a
Bering Straits subsidiary and Kaya Associates, another 8(a)
disadvantaged small business that often subcontracts for ANCs and
other 8(a) firms.163 Encouraging cooperation among 8(a) qualifying small
businesses may lead to disadvantaged firms growing together and
possibly merging with one another.
Clarifying the work performance requirements ensures that 8(a)
partners will have access to perform substantive work on procured
contracts. More importantly for ANCs, the revision places the 8(a)
partner in a position of control. These new specific guidelines fill in the
gray areas that previously led to substantially reduced profit margins
for 8(a) joint venture partners. For ANCs, the revisions ensure the ability
to form joint ventures, attempt complex and sophisticated contracts, and
subcontract as needed while operating within a system that facilitates
positive relationships.164
4. The “Three in Two” Rule
Prior to the 2011 Revisions, the “three in two” rule limited joint
ventures to submitting three offers to perform government contracts in a
two-year period.165 The original drafting of this rule failed to identify a
clear purpose, leading participants to apply their own interpretations of
the regulatory language. In fact, the original rule could be interpreted to

162. 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8243 (codified at 13 C.F.R. §
124.513(i)(1)–(2)).
163. Bering Kaya Support Services JV Receives Ft. Greely Contract, AGLUKTUK,
Jan./Feb. 2011, at 1, 3, available at http://beringstraits.com/northriver/wb/
media/agluktuk/2011/2011%20January%20February%20Annual%20Meeting.p
df;
see
also
Company
Portfolio,
KAYA
ASSOCIATES,
INC.,
http://www.kayacorp.com/portfolio/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
164. Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66.
165. 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h) (2010).
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compel joint ventures to create a new subsidiary and a new joint venture
each time it makes three bids, even if all three bids were made in a short
period of time, to remain active in the program. Now, after the 2011
Revisions, the regulation reads that joint ventures cannot be awarded
more than three contracts in two years.166 Changing a single word in the
provision has vast implications for joint ventures. Rather than limiting
the number of offers a joint venture makes, it limits the number of actual
contracts procured. Not only does the new language clarify the
legislative intent, it also expands opportunities for joint ventures.
Also, partners within a joint venture can be awarded up to three
additional contracts in that two-year period by forming additional joint
ventures. For example, Bering Straits’ aerospace subsidiary (BSA)
currently partners with a major corporation called LB&B to form the
BSA-LB&B joint venture. The revisions allow this joint venture to
procure three 8(a) government contracts over a two-year period. Then, if
they choose, BSA and LB&B can form another joint venture to double
the number of contracts awarded over the next two years.
But this option is not limitless. The SBA reserves discretion to make
a “finding of affiliation” if it determines that joint venture partners have
become contractually dependent on one another due to a longstanding
relationship.167 As a result, if BSA and LB&B continue to create joint
ventures together, the SBA reserves the right to deny the joint ventures
access to government contracts for the remainder of that two-year
period. The revised procurement limit will serve to counterbalance other
strict regulations by allowing joint ventures to be considered for more
contracts.
The expounded joint venture regulations described above will
profoundly impact how ANC joint venture partners perform 8(a)
contracts in the future. Even the slightest of these revisions, sometimes
changing only a single word in the regulation, guard 8(a) participants
from making business decisions based on incorrect interpretations of
regulatory intent. The commonality of 8(a) certified ANCs entering joint
ventures makes these revisions all the more important. Armed with
complete instructions, ANCs can join forces with other corporations
with clear expectations of the work to be performed and profit margins
to be earned.

166. 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h) (2012).
167. Id. § 121.103(f); see also 8(a) Business Development, 76 Fed. Reg. at 8223.
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CONCLUSION
In the forty years since ANCSA and twenty-five years since the
SBA opened the 8(a) BD Program to ANC participation, ANCs have
created thriving businesses to the benefit of Native communities. These
achievements are nothing less than admirable. But vague regulations
and lack of enforcement sometimes undermined the goals of Section
8(a). The SBA attempted to remedy these deficiencies. The results
consider the form and function of these regulations and make strides
toward taking a holistic view of Native-owned participant firms,
including ANCs.
The full impact of the 2011 Revisions is still unknown, but some
changes are certain to cause ANCs to significantly modify their business
plans.168 The new regulations better articulate program goals and will
push ANCs to develop viable subsidiaries without the support of the
8(a) BD program. Allowing 8(a) participants to shift NAICS codes
balances the increased oversight of size regulations and prevents
Native-owned businesses from continuously rotating subsidiaries
within an industry. ANCs can expect positive gains from this change.
For example, in 2010 an ANC called Koniag, Inc. attributed 71% of
revenues to services for the federal government but also saw revenues
increase by 29% due to subsidiary diversification. This considerable
growth in a single fiscal year is mostly attributable to entering new
markets.169
The creation of joint venture partnerships will become increasingly
competitive in coming years. Stricter rules place ANC joint venture
partners in control of contract performance and provide recourse for
mentor firm violations. As a result, ANCs will likely be more selective in
choosing their non-8(a) partners, an approach that will translate to non8(a) firms seeking to partner with 8(a) firms. Rather than relying on an
ANC merely to obtain access to 8(a) contracts, potential partners will
consider the ANC’s ability to take on a given contract, manage the
project, and complete its mandated portion of the work. Over time,
mentors with an improper view of program benefits may be effectively
phased out.
Moreover, joint ventures between 8(a) firm subsidiaries are a viable
option, offering both partners full access to 8(a) contracts without the
concern of regulations aimed at non-8(a) partner firms. This
arrangement is not unheard of. In 2000, ASRC and Chenega Technology
168. Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66.
169. Stricker, supra note 46, at 78–79.
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Services formed NJVC to offer IT services to the Department of
Defense.170 Calista’s Yulista Management and Sealaska’s SES, now both
8(a) BD Program graduates, together formed the joint venture JVYS.171 In
2010, Sealaska went so far as to acquire a former Hispanic-owned 8(a)
partner called Security Alliance of Florida.172 It is foreseeable that this
trend will expand under the revised regulations, promoting competition
among ANCs to form the most practical partnerships with other
qualifying firms.
All government contractors, both 8(a) and otherwise, will feel the
pinch of decreased government spending following these and other
regulatory revisions. Chugach Alaska Corporation (Chugach), with 64%
of revenues in government contracts, cited changes in government
contract procurement policies as a reason for contract losses and
decreased revenues from $1.1 billion in 2009 to $937 million in 2010.173
But budgetary changes and SBA regulatory revisions are applicable to
all government contractors. For this reason, ANCs might experience
lower revenues in the coming years, but they will not be any more
vulnerable to lost profits than other government contractors.
ANCs may be on equal footing with other 8(a) firms under the
finalized rule changes, but politics may play a large role as well.
Government contracting by Native-owned firms experienced a special
brand of negative attention during the revision process. The Nativeowned government contracting community worries that heightened
oversight and negative political attention may deter government
contracting officers from awarding contracts to Native-owned
businesses in the future. It remains to be seen to what extent these and
other regulatory revisions will change political attitudes and how those
changes will effect ANC contract procurement in the future.174

170. About Us, NJVC, http://www.njvc.com/about-us (last visited Feb. 19,
2012).
171. JOINT VENTURE YULISTA & SES, http://www.jvys.org (last visited Feb. 19,
2012).
172. Stricker, supra note 46, at 81.
173. Id. at 77.
174. This Article focuses on ANC participation in the 8(a) BD program, but
the FY10 Section 8(11) National Defense Regulation changes are suspected to
have an equal or greater impact on Native-owned firms. In short, 8(a) firms are
no longer exempt from the justification and approval process for defense
contracts valued over $20 million. ANCs comprise most of the few 8(a) firms
with the ability to perform contracts of this size. Some ANCs fear that the
negative political attention leading to the 8(a) and 8(11) changes will cause
contracting officers to avoid awarding contracts to Native-owned firms in the
future. Telephone Interview with Dennis Worden, supra note 66.
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Regulatory changes, budget cuts, and increased scrutiny of
government spending will cause the next two to five years to be difficult
while government contractors learn to operate within this new
paradigm.175 But the introduction of healthy competition and the push
to develop beyond 8(a) will spur ANC subsidiaries to grow faster and
eventually compete without government intervention. As ANCs rise to
the challenge, so will profits. Eventually, ANC subsidiaries will outgrow
the 8(a) BD Program with the confidence and capital to compete in the
greater market.

175. Id.

